OOPS, THEY DID IT AGAIN! THE FAILURE OF THE AMMAN TALKS

            A common theme found in the discourse surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict is the inability of peace talks to make any substantial progress in settling the territorial dispute between the Arabs and the Jews in Israel.  The inability of the international community and the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to come to an agreement on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict is once again demonstrated in the failure of the Amman talks that took place on January 25, 2012. The recent “peace talks” between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders were hosted in Amman, Jordan.   The talks were supervised by the international “Quartet”—which included the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), Russia, and the United States.  This failure appears to have been the impetus for the second request to the United Nations by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to recognize Palestinian statehood. On the website Bitter Lemons.org there are four editorials posted by academics and journalists who work with the online publication.  A common theme among the viewpoints is that the wheels of the peace talks continue to spin round and round as if stuck in mud with no hope of moving forward.

            Why is this the case? Is it political? Is it a failure of leadership? Is it the fault of the Palestinians? The Israelis?  The answer to this question depends on the point of view presented.  For example, according to Ghassan Khatib who represents the “Palestinian view”, the failure of the talks are a result of the failure of the Israeli government to stop the expansion of settlements into disputed territory as well as their failure to support a two state solution based on the borders of 1967.   Additionally, the talks “stalled” because of the failure of the international community to enforce international law to settle this dispute noting “we must rely on a third party” to resolve the conflict. Khatib argues that without international efforts by the US and the European Union, the two sides will never be “encouraged” (or pressured) to make an agreement.   According to Khatib, the Israelis are simply stalling in addressing their continued settlement expansion—this demonstrates that they have failed to take the talks (or past talks) seriously.  Khatib assumes that international pressure will resolve the decades-long conflict and that the stubbornness of the Israelis to compromise is the leading factors in the failure of the Amman talks.

            Maher Abukhater also representing the “Palestinian view” argues that the failure of border and security issues between the two nations is due to the international community putting pressure on President Abbas to negotiate while taking the side of the Israelis--this accusation is not backed by any real evidence only an unnamed Palestinian “official”.  Thus in his piece, the fault is not due to a lack of international action, but one that is biased towards the Israeli position. According to Abukhater, even Arab countries such as Jordan are pressuring the Palestinians to negotiate and the entire process appears to be tainted by a conspiracy between several Arab and western countries in their efforts to force Abbas to meet Israel’s demands.  For Abukhater, Abbas has few options open to him at this juncture, except to keep “talking” since this is the platform he ran on in 2005.  Abukhater also hints that because international aid is tied to his government he must continue to appease the western and Arab countries.

            On the Israeli side, Yossi Alpher sees the Amman talks as another act in the political “show” that the hosting and participating countries are starring in—all of whom are not really interested in a two state solution.  They are attending talks for their own political reasons.  Alpher presumes to know what the motives of the various participants are for participating in the talks.  For example, King Abdullah II can gain political points for hosting the meetings and at the same time demonstrate to the Palestinians in Jordan that Jordan can play a positive role in conflict resolution. But the fact that he didn’t bother to attend the talks (he simply sent an information officer) further demonstrates that this was simply a symbolic move on the part of the government.   The PLO leadership is also playing politics—Abbas understands that there can be no success if the goal is a “two state solution ending all claims” and that Abbas is simply pacifying the Quartet and King Abdullah in his efforts to fend of Hamas. 

            Alpher points out that Prime Minister Netanyahu understands that in an election year and therefore he must show good faith and participate in the talks to appease the centrist voters by appearing “reasonable”( even though the plans presented at the talks are not even close to the 1967 lines).  According to Alpher, the plans presented by Netanyahu do not support any of the positions at the Amman talks.  Additionally, the international Quartet is simply pursuing  “a path of folly”.   The failure to learn from past talks (e.g. Oslo Accords) demonstrate that the definition of insanity still holds true—keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect a different result! 

            Finally, Efraim Inbar offers an Israeli viewpoint, he also argues that the failure of the talks is of little surprise.  He primarily blames the Palestinians for the failure of the Amman talks due to their unilateral approach to peace negotiations and their unwillingness to accept the generous offers of 2000 and 2008 by the Israeli government.  According to Inbar  Prime Minister Netanyahu offered what was reasonable---Netanyahu could not improve upon the past.  While Inbar acknowledges that there were not many details about the talks, it appears that the Palestinians demand for Jerusalem was a major factor.  Additionally, he claims that the repeated refusal of the Palestinians to accept and acknowledge the Jewish state presents a major problem for the resolution of the conflict—it demonstrates that the Palestinians are not serious about peace.  They have also failed to demonstrate that they can successfully build a state.  He provides little factual evidence to support such claims.

            Efraim is quick to point out that conflict resolution must be replaced with conflict management and any attempts to conflict resolution are simply a facade.  The current political instability in the Arab countries has also hardened the position of the hardliners, especially because the pillar of Israel support (Egypt) is in serious jeopardy with the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt.

All the positions presented presume to know the political motives and preferences of the actors. They are also quick to place blame on the various actors associated with the peace talks. As one would expect in presenting viewpoints, some of factual information is tainted by ideological preferences.  The assumptions of the viewpoints presented are that the Amman talks were a failure. It is unclear to this blogger as to whether these talks have "failed"--at least the channels of communication are still in place.