Pray for Israel? The Impact of Hookers, Hash and Organized Crime on the Youth in Israel

In Donna Rosenthal’s chapter “Hookers and Hash in the Holy Land”, the author explores the underworld of Israeli society.  This includes hookers, pimps, drugs, drug runners and transnational criminal networks.  In her discussion she explains Israel’s contribution to both drug trafficking and human trafficking in that it serves as a venue through which drugs are smuggled into Europe and sex workers are smuggled in to Israel to service Israeli men.  Unsuspecting Eastern European women are trafficked into Israel along with large quantities of drugs by Russian and Bedouin Israelis.   

But its not just women and drugs that are smuggled into Israel; Rosenthal also notes that smuggling operations include weapons (such as M-16s and bombs) that are sold to Palestinians in the West Bank (393).   Rosenthal argues that Israel’s sunny climate is where the “shady “ come to do to business; it has been dubbed a “mobster’s paradise” (391).

            Rosenthal suggests that Israelis have had experience with such illicit drugs as hashish since the 1967 war (391) but it was on a much smaller scale.  She points out that today, the “multi-billion dollar drug trade is a bizarre model of Middle Eastern economic cooperation” which include Jewish, Bedouin, Lebanese, Egyptian and Palestinian partners who are supplied by groups operation in Afghanistan, Syria, East Asia and South America (392).

The increase in sex workers, drugs and weapons in Israel is largely due to the increasing numbers of Russian immigrants that are involved in organized crime.  This influence is apparent in the BBC news article "How the Russian Mafia is taking over Israel's Underworld" which further illustrates Rosenthal’s point that the organized crime activities include drugs, sex workers and weapons; and according to the BBC story one can add money laundering to the list of activities.  The story notes that in 1998 an estimated 4 billion dollars had been laundered in Israel--with current estimates as high as 20 billion.   What is significant about the increasing power and influence of the Russian Mafia is that its undermines the legitimacy of Israel’s political institutions given the wealth possessed by the criminal syndicate and its potential to corrupt government officials. 

But another concern worth noting is the impact that such demographic and societal changes have had on Israel’s youth—the number of at-risk teens in Israel is increasing and more and more Israeli teens are using drugs and engaging in prostitution.  Thus there appears to be a correlation between the legalization of prostitution in 2010 and the increase in teenage prostitution.  There also appears to be a relationship between the increase in social acceptance of drugs and its availability, and the increase in drug use among teenagers.   This begs the question—what are some of the consequences this cultural shift? What impact has the liberalization of sex and drugs had on Israeli youth?

According to The Learn and Live Foundation  and The Jewish Federation of North America of the 2.3 million Israeli youths approximately 350,000 are “at risk” and 11% of Israelis that use drugs are between the ages of 12-18. A 2009 article in the Jerusalem Post reported that of the 10,000 prostitutes in Israel 10% or 1,000 of them are minors.   Additionally, a 2011 Youth at Risk report cited in the Jerusalem Post (presented by the non-profit group Elem) reports that there has been a sharp increase in minors drinking, using drugs and engaging in risking sexual practices for commodities such as cigarettes, alcohol and drugs.   
The problem of drinking, drug use and teenage pregnancy is also cited in Haaretz's online  article "Teen Pregnancy, Drug use and Drinking on the rise in Israel".    In an effort to combat such issues, the non-profit group Elem has started several campaigns including the  “up all night campaign” aimed at rescuing Israeli teens from going into the sex trade and "Friendship Vans"  that operate nightly in 18 cities and towns—going into public parks, beaches and entertainment centers, abandoned areas and prostitution haunts where at-risk teens tend to hang out. 





They offer immediate help to homeless youth by providing humanitarian aid, informal counseling and referrals to other social services.  Elem has also spearheaded the “Lights of Hope” campaign aimed at raising awareness of issues faced by Israeli.  The non-profit has also expanded the campaign on various social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. 

Critics from the various news sources cited in this blog argue that the Israeli government is failing to address the growing numbers of under-aged prostitutes and increasing numbers of teenagers that are using drugs and that the government is not well suited to address the issues.  As noted by  Yitzhak Kadman a Jerusalem-based lobbyist for the National Council for the Child,  in an era of government cuts and austerity in the areas of social spending and the availability of pornographic material that appears to legitimate sex with children it is understandable why teenage prostitution is on the rise. Add to the mix the increasing availability of drugs and a "youth culture" that accepts drug use as legitimate and normal and you have the making of a serious crises.

The serious issues affecting the future generations of Israel such as prostitution and drugs and the increasing numbers of "at risk youth" do not get much attention in Rosenthal’s chapter—she primarily focuses on the “week-end users” and doesn’t get into a discussion of these problems.  Rosenthal indicates that drug use among Israeli adolescents has become part of the “youth culture” as evidenced by research done by Yoav Ben-Dov.  This author on youth culture claims that in Israel  “there is not much shame in using drugs in Israel anymore—its out in the open” (394-395).  Indeed the chapter illustrates how in many ways Israel is facing a cultural revolution on various levels.  The question that remains is in what way has the increasing presence of drugs and prostitution that is a direct result of the increasing power and influence of the Russian mafia contributed to the problems faced by the Israeli teens?  Following what Rosenthal demonstrated in her chapter on "Hookers and Hash in the Holy Land" this blog has attempted to demonstrate that perhaps there is a relationship between the two.  The sources found online appear to be credible, although many of the news stories use the findings and statistics provided by the non-profit group Elem.  

Theocracy or Democracy? Religious Intolerance and Conflict between Ultra-Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Jews in Israel

Debra Rosenthal discusses the plight of the non-Orthodox, secular Jews in Israel in her book The Israelis (2008).  In her chapter entitled “the Non-Orthodox” the author identifies a type of culture war that is going on in Israel between the ultra Orthodox, and the non-Orthodox Israelis.   The idea of a conflict between Israeli Jews seems counter intuitive given that when most people think of Israel and intra-state, inter-faith fighting, they think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or a conflict between Muslims and Jews and not a conflict between the ultra-Orthodox and the non-Orthodox Jews.  The tension between the different groups appears to be a serious concern facing Israeli society based on the testimonials provided in Rosenthal. 

Upon initial investigation of the nature of this tension, media images and news footage tend to support the claim of inter-faith Jewish infighting demonstrated in the images below.  In the town of Beit She mesh, an ultra-Orthodox Jewish man (below) argues with a secular man during a protest against the  Israeli government.  Some within the ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) community see the Israeli government as "illegitimate" as evidenced by their reference to the "evil Israeli government".   In this new story by PRI's "The World" some within the ultra-Orthodox community accuse the Israeli state of trying to eliminate the ultra-Orthodox.   The poster exemplifies the sentiment of some within the haredi community (lower left corner) the story notes that posters are how many of the ultra-Orthodox communicate with each other.

Rosenthal clearly identifies the tension between 80% of the Israeli population that are secular and the 10% of the ultra-Orthodox community (haredi Jews).  She discusses how the secular Jews feel resentment because of their perception that the ultra-Orthodox Jews take more than their fair share of the Jewish Welfare State (the ultra-Orthodox community tends to have very large families even up to 10 to 12 children) and the ultra-Orthodox Jews tend to pay less taxes compared to  the other groups in Israel.  Adding to the tension is the fact that the haredi Jews do not have to serve in the military (every Israeli is forced to conscription).   In some ways, as Rosenthal suggests, the revisionists and conservative Jews that primarily make up the non-Orthodox community feels discriminated against and harassed by the ultra-Orthodox.   They even feel that they have few venues to practice their faith, as Rosenthal notes that 98% of the synagogues are Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox  (232).  In the city of Jerusalem which is made up of non-Orthodox, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox populations, the three groups often "bump shoulders" and  non-Orthodox Jews are often  are harassed by "morality police" or spit upon by the ultra-Orthodox for their "evil and immoral ways".

The video "Israel: A Secular State?"  highlights the frustration felt by both the ultra-Orthodox and non-Orthodox  Jews in Jerusalem.  Both feel that they are facing "religious coercion":

The video notes that recently Israel's first crematorium was firebombed and many suspect it was a member of the ultra-Orthodox community.  The story further underlies the tension felt in Israel between the different religious sects, with some arguing that its not that the ultra-Orthodox are more "extreme" rather this appears to be the case because they are being more "vocal" than they have been in the past.   Based on Rosenthal and other internet sources, it does appear that in some ways, the secular voices in the Israeli government are being drowned out by a small but growing segment of the population (the haredi).    This is demonstrated in Rosenthal’s work where she describes the reaction of the ultra-Orthodox community when the Israeli Supreme Court ruled in favor of  "religious pluralism" (something that the majority of Israelis support) ruling that this religious faction could be forced to serve in the military. They staged violent protest and spit on people who challenge them (spitting is the worst insult you can do to a person).    Against this backdrop Rosenthal demonstrates that many legal battles have been won by the secularist using the legal pathway, given that the Israeli Supreme Court has tended to support the idea of religious pluralism.The video below shows ultra-Orthodox clashing with police over a public parking structure that was allowed to operate on the Sabbath:

Discrimination against non-Orthodox Jews as a a result of the influence of the ultra-Orthodox is noted in The Jewish Baltimore Times, where it is reported that leaders of the Israeli Reform and Conservative movements sent letters of complaint to the Israeli government charging that Israeli hotels continue to discriminate against non-Orthodox Jews.   The group leaders charged that Israeli hotels refused to grant rooms and the use of Torah scrolls to non-Orthodox Jews.   Specifically, a Conservative tour group was denied access to the use of a Torah scroll because they planned to hold an egalitarian prayer service (which would include women).

Another story that made headlines (from NTDTV Television, a Chinese news source) is the story of a woman (Tanya Rosenblit) who refused to move to the back of a pubic bus and became a "secular" (a type of "Rosa Parks) hero to some Israelis who have felt antagonism towards the ultra-Orthodox community and the refusal of the elected government officials to stand up against this segment of the ultra-Orthodox community (per NTDTV gender segregation by force on buses in Israel is not legal).

Thus complaints of discrimination highlighted in Rosenthal's book can be found all over the news media; in print (online), radio and television.   Even during a news story cited in this blog, a journalist for "The Real News" in the story "Women fight Religious Segregation"" (Lia Taranchansky) covering the story on the tension between the ultra-Orthodox and the non-Orthodox was approached by an ultra-Orthodox men explaining that she had no right to be out in public and she was not allowed to interview any haredi men (video is embedded below).

Thus many Israelis feel that there exists a secular, non-secular state in Israel and criticism of a lack of religious pluralism is not just from Jewish groups within Israel.  The International Community has also criticized Israel for not providing for true religious freedom finding that Israel has favored Orthodox religious values at the expense of other religious faiths.  The bottom line is that the haredi want absolutely no interference in family/religious issues by the Israeli state.  Many secular Jews want the state to stand up to what they see as "fundamentalism". The video below, frames the story as "the Battle for Israel":

            So the question this raises is-- are the other 80% fighting back? If so, how?  Rosenthal identifies a political campaign against the Ultra Orthodox community that gave  rise to the Shinui party that reflected a temporary coalition between (provide link)..  According to the Huffington Post article Israelis, Resentful Of Orthodox Grip on Society, Fight Back" hundreds of Israeli Jews protested declaring that "Israel is not Iran".  The greatest tension appears to be the violence and or practices against women by the Orthodox Jews who do not tolerate any deviation to their behavior.  

Additionally, many women leaders in Israel are not only concerned about the lack of respect for women by some ultra-Orthodox but also for their failure to recognize the authority of the Israeli state.  As the video "Women Fight Religious Segregation" demonstrates, women leaders are speaking out against the radical behavior of some of the ultra-Orthodox community.  For example, Labor leader MK Sheli Yechimovitch and Tzipi Livini, leader of the opposition party and member of the Knessett are outspoken on their views on this issue:

Rosenthal notes that an anti-haredi counter-demonstration formed in support of the Supreme Court's decision to outlaw army exemptions for  haredi males led to the formation of the Shinui party (meaning change) which became the second largest party in government in 2003 (although it failed to deliver the change it was promising, 246).

Its is important to mention that not all of the ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox groups are repressing the secular populations.  As evidenced by the video above, and the new story from  "The World" (PRI International) many members of the ultra-Orthodox community feel that leaders within this community need to speak out against religious zealots and publicly condemn such radical behavior as spitting on 8 year old girls.  Indeed, many of the protesters demonstrating against the "fundamentalists" are in fact ultra-Orthodox Jews who feel that the actions of a few are creating problems for the those that want peaceful coexistence.  However, Rosenthal notes that "a whopping 64% of the ultra-Orthodox believe that Israel should be a theocracy" (245). 

While it is easy to overly dramatize the tension that exists between the secular and non-secular (ultra-Orthodox/non-Orthodox) populations, and it is important to point out that such tension makes great news headlines and helps to sensationalize the problem--there does appear to be a real problem in Israel.  Such media  reports sell papers and maintain viewers, listeners and readers! Indeed,  the images only give us a glimpse of what is going on in Israel and the videos are just as guilty of only showing an "piece" or reality.  However, the news sources cited/discussed in this blog appear to be valid and impartial, many of which take an objective view of this issue (discussing both sides and interviewing scholars, political and religious leaders from the ultra-Orthodox and non-Orthodox communities).  What is apparent is that several sources online support Rosenthal's observation that the majority of Israeli's support a secular state and at the same time wish to respect the religious practices found within Judaism.  The problem is for a small segment of the ultra-Orthodox population, that is not enough--they want all Israelis to practice Judaism their way.  Its clear that the Israeli public feels that it is a problem when the state of  Israel fails to protect people of all faiths (or of little faith). What is interesting is that like in the United States, it is often the Supreme Court that continues to protect religious pluralism.  As one account in Rosenthal's book sums it up best: "the Haredim need to understand that if it were "not for non-religious Zionist who brought Jews here, a lot of haredi families probably would have been killed" (238). 

So the question this leaves us with is whether Israel will maintain its democratic foundations or become more theocratic.  As one ultra-Orthodox Jew noted in the video "A Secular State?":   "Israel is a Democracy based on the will of the majority, some day we will be the majority".  It doesn't appear that this very contentious issue will be not resolved any time soon. 

The Other 10%: What Life is Like for Gay Arabs (is this an oxymoron?)

A few months ago, watching the news in the run-up to the Iraq war, I spotted a couple of demonstrators marching to a "Queers for Palestine" banner. Note the preposition. While most of the antiwar marchers were merely against war (even if this meant keeping Saddam Hussein in power), these two were for Palestine. I spent the remainder of the evening trying to think of the nearest equivalent. Blacks for the Old South? Jews for the Ayatollah? "Recovered" homosexuals?

           The idea of a Palestinian man or woman being openly gay and accepted by the Palestinian community is somewhat of an oxymoron according to Tom Gross' Brutality Against Homosexuals in the Arab World.  This idea is also suggested by Donna Rosenthal's chapter "Oy! Gay?" in her work The Israelis (2008).  The complexity of Israeli society is demonstrated by Rosenthal’s portrayal of gay and lesbian life in Israel.  The overall tolerance and acceptance of the homosexual community that Rosenthal depicts is somewhat of a conundrum given the religious and cultural diversity of its population many of whom not only lack tolerance for homosexuality, they see it as an abomination to their traditional cultural and religious values. Yet amid this diverse and multicultural society homosexual rights are protected and safeguarded by the state of Israel—they can adopt, they can claim property rights for their significant others and they can openly serve in the military.  Homosexuals have been given "special protection" per the 1998 sexual harassment law (371).   So while traditional cultures within Israel don’t accept their lifestyles, the Israeli state demonstrates a tremendous amount of respect for the homosexuals right to live freely and without fear of retribution or discrimination by the government.

            According to Rosenthal, the Israeli government is so committed to this cause that we see the use of public service ads that address the concerns of young men and women (teens) coming to terms with their sexual identity. Rosenthal’s observation is further demonstrated by the video below that portrays young Israeli men and women challenging traditional gender roles and being comfortable crossing over to gay/transgender experience:

After watching this very colorful and upbeat public service message, one gets the sense that its not only okay, but "fun" to find out who you really are as a young person in Israel.  But is it this true for all Israelis that want to "come out of the closet" and be who they really are? Is this true for Palestinians in Israel? For the Palestinians in the occupied territories?  Rosenthal also explores the dark side to being gay in Israel by identifying the tensions that exist within the traditional communities in their inability to come to terms with a gay son, daughter, spouse or other family member.  This dimension is clearly outlined in the context of Palestinian Christian and Muslim homosexuals who find it nearly impossible to come out and face a culture that condemns homosexuality.  The situation for gay Palestinian men and women is even more severe in the  occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza.  The initial question(s) this raises include: is gay life more difficult for Arab Israelis?  How does the Arab Israeli conflict play into this discussion?  What about being Palestinian and gay in the occupied territories?  What about those gay Palestinians seeking asylum in Israel? 

For Palestinians, being gay is akin to having the plague in a culture and religion that does not tolerate homosexuality.  As  Yossi Klein Halevi points out in The New Republic, Islamic law prescribes five separate forms of death for homosexuals and on top of that, the Palestinian Authority adds several additional punishments for being gay. Halevi notes that the torment of gays is the official Palestinian policy of the PA.
In the West Bank city of Tulkarm, Halevi tells the story of a young Palestinian homosexual he calls Tayseer who discovered early on growing up in Gaza that being gay was the same as being a criminal.  When he was arrested by an undercover police officer he was told that to avoid prison he would have to work as an undercover sex agent (entrapping other homosexuals).  When he refused to cooperate he "was forced to stand in sewage up to his neck, his head covered by a sack filled with feces, and then he was thrown into a dark cell infested with insects and other creatures he could feel but not see... During one interrogation, police stripped him and forced him to sit on a Coke bottle. Throughout the entire ordeal he was taunted by interrogators, jailers, and fellow prisoners for being a homosexual." Tayseer is currently living as a refugee in an Arab Israeli village.  Halevi  tells another story of a Palestinian homosexual who was put in a pit in Nablus and starved to death over Ramadan; of another whose PA interrogators "cut him with glass and poured toilet cleaner into his wounds".  One young man lives in constant fear that he will be killed by his family members.  Such stories of torture and abuse by the PA makes Halevi wonder why more international attention hasn't been given to the plight of Palestinians living in the occupied territories.

Halevi's description of what he terms the Palestinian (gay) refugee problem is further demonstrated by the video clip below.  This video conveys what life is like in Israel for gay Palestinians who flee the occupied territory.  Specifically, the Palestinian teen in the video explains that he was jailed at the age of 12 for being gay (he had fled to Israel when discovered, but returned because he was home sick).  The young man interviewed describes what life was like for him when he was jailed: he was constantly beaten and harassed.  He was told that he had been "perverted by Israel".  

Once he was released he fled to Israel and turned to prostitution to support himself. He has been living underground.  The teen can't go back home, if discovered he would be deported by the Israeli authorities.  He currently lives in Tel Aviv and seeks refuge in an unnamed community center, where the counselor named Shaoul explains that the young man is in an untenable situation:  he can't go come because he will be killed by either the PA or his family and he can't come out of hiding or he will be deported where he is sure to be killed.  The young man explains that he knew two boys that tried to go back and they were killed.  The boy (now 16) says, "my dreams are simple: I want to be accepted".   This situation stands in stark contrast to the videos depicting the happy go lucky gay teens who are free to be themselves and try on colorful clothing.

As the video suggests, the plight of the gay Palestinians has been addressed by community support groups in Israel.  According to Rosenthal, the JOH, or the Jersalem Open House makes a special effort to target their resources towards the Palestinians community (379).  An interview with a JOH counselor below sheds life on the political, social and cultural difficulties faced by Palestinian gays: 

   The counselor  notes, “your sexual identity develops at the expense of your Palestinian identity” acknowledging that while the Israeli community has a long way to go and the Palestinian community has an even farther way to go in accepting homosexuals.  Other stories further suggest this notion.

           The obstacles faced by Israel/Palestinian couples and its relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict is also depicted in Rosenthal's book.  For example, Rosenthal discusses a gay Israeli jew, Ezra who is fighting to get citizenship for his Muslim Palestinian partner, Selim.  Selim served time in prison for his participation in the first intifada but now works with his lover in his plumbing business (380).  She notes that many homosexual Palestinians are seeking political asylum in Israel (380).
Such gay love stories are also depicted in the film The Bubble   (video clip on right) which shows the difficulties faced by Palestinian and Jewish Israeli gay couples that try to stay together during this conflict (371).  In the film,  an Israeli national guardsman Noam conspires to help his Palestinian lover Asraf stay in Tel Aviv.  Like the teen depicted in the real-life video, Asraf is facing the problem of being gay, Palestinian and facing deportation to a territory (PA) that will undoubtedly condemn him to death. The Bubble demonstrates the harsh realities faced by homosexuals in Israel and the territories and how the conflict further exacerbates such difficulties. As Rosenthal suggests according to Arab culture "being called an 'int a luti' (you're a homosexual) is tantamount to being condemned to death" (376).  In other words, being gay and Arab is somewhat of an oxymoron.

The Fog of (Possible) War

There’s Something About Iran…Ramifications of the Israel-US-Iran Confrontation

         How does the Israeli-US-Iranian Crises impact the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?  Does this explain why is the international community ignoring the Palestinian issue?  How does the political upheaval in Syria or Arab Spring in general fit into this discussion?  Will resolving the Iranian crises first lead to a higher likelihood that the Israeli-Palestinean peace process will succeed?  Such questions are addressed by both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the bitter lemons.org website that addresses the Iranian crisis and its implication for resolving the Palestinian issue. 

         According to the Israeli view put forth by Yossi Alpher in his editorial "Its Not Iran" what happens between Israel and Iran (whether its resolved diplomatically or militarily) is irrelevant to the peace process between Israel and Palestinians since its not actively being sought by either side.  At the same time he notes that resolution of the conflict (eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat) would mean that the international community could once again focus on the peace process. This is what the Palestinian leadership should be striving for if they want the possibility of a two state solution.  He posits that a resolution between Israel and Palestinians could essentially soften the “instinctive” “anti-Israeli” rhetoric that a war with Iran would ignite.

Alpher also surmises that if the Alawite regime in Syria is eliminated then that too, would allow for the focus to go back to the peace process.  Since eliminating a regime that had sponsored such [anti-Israeli] terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah that would allow the peace process to “return to the agenda”.  Thus according to Alpher one of the main reasons why the Israeli-Palestinian issue has been ignored has to do with Arab Spring and the revolutionary wave that has spread throughout the Middle East. This has placed the conflict on a lower priority by the international community and Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu. Such world events in addition to the fact that it is a US election year have meant that there will be no progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process.   Alpher suggests that the Fatah leadership under President Mahmoud Abbas needs to abandon the old rhetoric of previous leaders and find a new “narrative” that eliminates the pre-1967 issues of the right of return and holy places. He argues that since the peace talks are clearly on hiatus, the Israeli and Palestinians leadership should take the time to seek an alternative to Oslo. 

     Alpher claims that such international events or threats have nothing to do with the Israeli Palestinian peace process, but in fact according to his editorial they do.  Alpher’s assertions are speculative--one doesn’t know whether resolving the Iranian issue would make Netanyahu more amiable to peace with the Palestinians or influence the international community to refocus its attention on Israeli-Palestinian issue.  Perhaps if the conflict is resolved by force and not diplomatically, that would give Netanyahu assurance that holding a hard line with the Palestinians is the way to go. Or perhaps there are other factors that influence Netanyahu’s position towards the Palestinian leadership under President Abbas (mainly its relationship with Hamas?)  Perhaps another international crises will emerge in the near future--no one really knows. His assertion that the issue has been placed on the “back burner” (by the international community and Netanyahu) is apparent by the increased focus of the traditional actors involved in the peace talks (the US, Israel, Europe-- except for the Palestinians) on the Iranian crises.   Alpher asserts that those in the international community not involved in the crisis of Iran, Arab revolutions or involved in US elections should be focusing their attention on the peace process. This leaves open an important question:  Doesn’t a peace process also have to have both of the actors that are seeking peace make it a top priority for them as well?

            “Crisis creates opportunity” or so the Chinese proverb expressed by Gershon Baskin in his editorial entitled "From Crises to Crises". So how does the Iranian crisis create an opportunity for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Contrary to Alpher’s claim that there are benefits to resolving the Iranian issue before resolving the Palestinian issue, this Israeli perspective Gershon Baskin suggests that what would offset the pan-Arab reaction to an [inevitable] war with Iran would be an earnest attempt by the US and Europe to encourage Israel and Palestinian leadership to get the peace talks back on track.   So even if Israel and Iran are inevitably going to war (crises) there emerges the opportunity out of this crises to solidify the peace negotiations and doing so would quell anti-Israeli groups that would be in support of Iran.  He also notes that there may be little to gain by attacking Iran since it would ultimately destroy the opposition forces that are currently seeking to remove the ayatollahs whose legitimacy is in decline. 

            For Gershon, not only is there high tension and anxiety among the Israelis as a result of the Iranian conflict, any security issues that arise in the West Bank or Gaza in this atmosphere may result in an increase or “tightening” of security forces and regular army incursions Palestinian cities.   To complicate matters further, each side assume to know what the other is thinking--neither Netanyahu nor Abbas really want to reach an agreement.  This is supported by Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe “Boogie” Yaalon’s claim that we can only speak about conflict management.   Baskin notes that based on his “private discussions” with President Abbas that the President is quite open to negotiate with Netanyahu.  What is unclear is why President Abbas has not publicly made this claim but has only confided in Baskin about his position.  Some of what Baskin discusses in his editorial is speculative—we don’t know that attacking Iran would increase the support of the existing regime, nor do we know that Israel will necessarily tighten its security measures in Palestinian cities for fear of upheavals by pro-Iranian Palestinian groups.

Ghassan Khatab in his editorial, "Palestinians are caught in the Middle" provides a different (Palestinian) perspective on the Israeli-Iranian conflict.  Like the other editorials found in the posts he acknowledges that this conflict has regional and international implications, and he too believes that Iran is at the top of both the US and Israel’s agenda suggesting that the Palestine issue has fallen to the wayside. According to Khatab, the Palestinians are “caught in the middle” of a power play between China, Russia, Iran the US and Israel.  Adding to this complex power play is the political upheaval in Syria. He notes that Syria’s domestic conflict is now having regional and international implications because of the tension surrounding Iranian issue.  The problem is that Syria is supported by Iran (who is supported by both China and Russia) and if Syria falls, it would diminish Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria and its influence over Lebanon thus weakening its Iranian proxy (Hezbollah).  Iran cannot afford to lose this strategic axis.  For Khatab the implications go beyond “Arab Spring” and the issues of democracy and economic development—its now about preserving each actor’s strategic interests.

Khatab’s main concern is that there is increasing tension and speculation about what war with Iran would mean for the region, for Israel, for the Palestinians, for US allies and US strategic interests (oil) .The tension of the west is demonstrated by the increasing pressure on Israel to avoid war and instead seek other tactics such as embargos.  Moreover, this tension is spilling over into the internal divisions within Palestinian politics (unlike Gershon, who argues he tension will lead to increasing security forces in Palestinian cities) thus radicalizing those within Hamas that did not support the Doha Accords.

 

Khatab posits that the main factor limiting the options of the Palestinians is the tension between the west and Iran and all of the other complex power struggles within and outside of the region. Clearly, the factionalization among the Palestinians leadership is not just the result of regional and international tension--internal politics have played a role as well.  His suggestion that Palestinian interests have been left behind as a result of the Israeli-US-Iranian conflict and Arab Spring is supported in the media suggesting that the Palestinian issue has been sidelined as a result of the crisis.    The New York Times further support’s Khatab’s argument that Iran’s interest in Syria is a factor in the Israeli-US-Iranian conflict.  But it is unclear how internal divisions within the Doha accords is causing a problem for the Israeli-Palestinian issue given that Israel is not in favor of the a coalition between the parties of Fatah and Hamas.  If anything, it appears that a unified Palestinian front as a result of the  Doha Accords is in fact increasing tension with Israel.

Mkhaimar Abusada’s  post "The Impact of US-Israeli Confrontation with Iran" presents a similar argument to that of Khatab.  He argues from a Palestinian perspective that for decades, the larger regional and global conflicts continue to impact the status of Palestinians resolving their status of being a “nation without a state” (or so it is claimed).    Abusada like Baskin speculates that there will be no resolution to the Israeli-US-Iranian crisis, rather it is only a matter of time until the US and Israeli forces attack Iran, speculating that the Obama Administration wants to ensure another term and so they are pressuring Netanyahu not to act unilaterally until the elections are over.

 

 He argues that both the US and Europe are concerned that an attack on Iran will have heavy economic, political and military implications.  He asserts that attacking Iran unilaterally is not supported by the Israeli people (they are obsessed with the US as an ally) but does not cite any actual polls. Abusada further speculates that given the hawkish nature of the Likud party and Netanyahu’s desire for another term in office, an attack on Iran would have a positive impact on the party’s ability to maintain political power.   He also claims that Netanyahu is pressuring the Obama administration not to support NATO forces in Syria, since the collapse of the regime would create serious problems for a quiet Israeli-Syrian relationship.

The editorial posts found on bitterlemons.org are surprisingly similar in their argument that the major actors in the Israeli-US-Iranian conflict want Syria’s regime under Alawite to stay in power—but writers such as Abudada and Khatab suggests that Syrian’s political stability benefits different actors. All the authors recognize the impact that regional conflicts and watershed events such as the “Arab Spring” have further destabilized the region, strengthened Iran and increased tensions between Israel and Iran. Additionally they suggest that the conflict has either further divided the leadership of the Palestinians and or has ultimately have placed the peace talks "on the back burner" once again.    Is this crises going to further create opportunity or will it deepen the Arab-Israeli crisis?  Will an attack on Iran hurt the peace process? Would resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crises offset the possible backlash by anti-Israeli groups?  All of the authors have different yet similar answers.  As the above cartoon depicting the perspectives of the US-Israeli-Iranian (and other) actors suggests,  how to respond to the crises (and its implications for peace) is unclear.  Just as the discourse and rhetoric surrounding the Israeli-Iranian conflict is confusing and muddled so too are its implications for the continuation of peace negotiations between Israel and Palestinians.  Each perspective has a different take on Iranian crises and its implication for Israeli-Palestinian peace (which is dependent upon whether the US-Israel and Iran go to war) and are of course guided by each author’s ideological preferences.    

IS THIS ISRAELI APARTHEID?

How does one characterize the nature of Palestinian-Israeli relations today? Can it be considered a current example of apartheid; a policy of de jure segregation that prompted such international responses as sanctions and boycotts that ultimately ended this system of state-sponsored segregation and discrimination.  The online source bitterlemons.org provides a variety of perspectives addressing whether the status of Palestinians can be considered the equivalent to that of what the blacks in South Africa experienced under apartheid.

The responses range from outright denial and anger at the prejudice of the international community against the state of Israel (e.g. UN) to a more tacit acceptance that while discrimination exists, it is essential for Israeli security. On the Palestinian side one finds that the viewpoints see similarities between the Israeli policies and the policies of apartheid in South Africa.  The distinction is whether one is referring to the settlements or in the state itself.

The first post is by Gerald M. Steinberg (a professor of Political Science at Bar Ilan University) entitled “Exploiting apartheid for political warfare” argues that the use of the term “apartheid” serves to delegitimize the existence of the Israeli nation-state.  The nature of this type of political warfare emerged from the September 2001 UN Conference in the Non-Governmental Organization forum on Racism and Discrimination in Durban that was also accompanied by the BDS campaigns (boycott, divestment and sanctions).  He argues that this campaign is simply the continuation of the Arab rejection of the November 1947 UN Partition plan.  He argues that the use of the term also serves to “immorally exploit” the suffering of those who suffered under the system of apartheid.  To support his claim he quotes a former justice of the South African Constitutional Court who denounced the comparison in a New York Times editorial claiming it was unfair and inaccurate slander against Israel.  Furthermore Steinberg quotes South African journalist Benjamin Pogrund to support his position.

Steinberg also claims that while Israel is criticized by the international community (the UN) the same criticism is not applied to Islamic states that continue to abuse human rights and systematically deny equal rights to women and other ethnic minorities. The term “apartheid” is never applied to these countries.  There are clearly “blatant double standards” when it comes to the use of this term.   The Arab bloc within the UN and influence of media sources allows for such anti-Israeli platforms to exist.   Such rhetoric inhibits the development of the peace process by promoting mutual hatred and anger. 

Steinberg notes that the reality is that Israel’s diverse Arab citizenry (composed of Christian, Druze and Muslim faiths) do in fact enjoy property rights, voting rights and equal protection and equal access to state-provided services.  There are even Arabs in the Israeli high court. 

Upon review Steinberg’s claims his reference to Goldberg and Pogrund’s statements are factually correct however he fails to mention that Pogrund also acknowledged that the Palestinian refugees live in despair and degradation and that there are similarities with the South African example in the element of control. He further notes that the tension between the Jews and the Gaza and West Bank Arabs will only be resolved when each learns to respect the humanity of the other.  Steinberg also fails to mention the Israeli boycott of the UN Commission meeting in 2001.  Additionally, his claim that UN ignores the human rights abuses that exist in Islamic states is exaggerated and not supported by any evidence. 

Shlomo Gazat (a retired IDF Major General) in “the many faces of discrimination” distinguishes between South African “apartheid” and Israeli “discrimination” of the Palestinians and other non-Jews living in the Israeli territories.  Gazat notes that the situation for Palestinians in Israel is not ideal—they do face discriminatory practices and laws.  His argument that Palestinians do live in a discriminatory environment is evidenced by the “law of return” that permits open immigration for any Jew but does prohibits it for Arabs or any other nationalities.  Additionally, Palestinians born in Jerusalem who are now abroad are not allowed to return to their birthplace.  This situation, according to Gazat is compounded by the fact the current Knesset is overly nationalistic and has adopted a “dangerous pattern of legislation” exemplified by the Nekba law that withdraws government support to any Arab institution that commemorates the events of the 1948 war from an Arab perspective or the “admissions committees” that determines where or non-Jewish families can live; or even the law requiring a loyalty oath to Israel and Zionism.  Those who originate from an “enemy territory” can also be refused citizenship.  He notes that another law being proposed is to cancel Arabic as an “official Israeli language”.

Gazat argues that the residents of the sovereign territories are faced with discrimination and while equality under the law exists in Israel the same cannot be said for those living outside the state.   Because the Israeli government is in charge of the creation of both de jure and de facto law in its settlements (which has been supported by the Israeli Supreme Court) it has justified discrimination in such territories light of its security needs. 

Several of Gazat’s references to law are factually correct although his reference to the “law of return” suggests that only Jews can become citizens in Israel. There must be other ways that non-Jews can become Israeli citizens, or other types of naturalization laws?  In addition, there is not enough evidence provided to support the example of the anti-Arabic law currently being proposed in the Knesset. 

The post by Samah Jabr (a free lance writer and psychiatrist) “Apartheid has a face” provides another perspective on the Israeli-South African Apartheid perspective.  Jabr’s post is rather solemn in tone and through anecdotal evidence he suggests that the comparison is legitimate.  He notes “every day that it [discrimination] goes unaddressed my people are forced to take a step backward into unfairness and loss”.  He descries how upon driving down Jerusalem’s Route 1 he was bombarded by young Jewish orthodox boys who threw a Molotov cocktail into his car.  When approached by the police the incident was dismissed as simply a harmless “Purim” toy.  Even though the boys have continued to harass Arab drivers, the police fail to respond.

Another example provided by Jabra also describes the scene of a horrific traffic accident in “Area C” (where the Palestinian Authority has no power).  The accident was between a Palestinian truck driver and a bus carrying students.  He notes that what was unusual about the incident was that it occurred in an area that has inferior road systems and suffer from limited basic services. According to Jabr, although the emergency response teams are only minutes away, it took ambulances and fire crews almost an hour to respond to the fiery crash.  He speculates that this is because the victims were Palestinians and notes that the media focused on how the Israeli medical teams helped to rescue the children and take them to “good” Israeli hospitals.  But the reality is that the existence of poor infrastructure, checkpoints and other barriers creates an inherent unequal environment for Palestinians in comparison to Israeli citizens.

Jabr provides a rather loose definition of “apartheid” defining it as a system of discrimination.   His evidence is anecdotal and subjective.  His reference to the "bus crash" is historically correct however his claims are speculative in regards to the nature of the response.

Finally, the interview with John Dugard (a professor of international law, and a former member of the UN Human Rights Commission) reveals how depending on the question is asked and the sources used, dictates the answer to the question as to the similarity between apartheid and Israeli practices. Primarily, Dugard notes that there are similar features in that there is discrimination, and that Palestinians and Jews can be considered separate “races”. Under apartheid the white South Africans were the settlers and the policies favored them at the expense of the black South Africans. If viewed form this perspective than the comparison is valid.  Dugard notes, “we all have a sense of Déjà vu”.  He suggests that Archbishop Desmond Tutu noted that the situation in the Palestinian territory is in many respects worse.
Dugard also responds to Goldstone’s claims that the comparison was “slanderous” when his [Goldstone’s] own report confirmed that the system in the occupied Palestinian territory is a “form of apartheid”.  He argues that the UN definition of “apartheid” does apply to Israel in the context of the “inhumane acts” such as unlawful or targeted killings, detention without trial and the intentional purpose of domination of one racial group over another; “here too, I think that one can correctly say that the purpose of these inhumane acts is to maintain the domination of the settlers in Palestinian territory”.   This for Dugard can be seen as a form of colonialism, and in both cases the actions of the regimes have been been condemned by the international community.  

Dugard’s criticism is primarily in the context of the position of settlers and suggests that Israel’s practices in Israel itself, do not really constitute a form of apartheid.   He notes that the US and European public need to be educated and shown the similarities, as should the Israelis.  He also questions the validity of the BDS action program; “I can see the merits of it, but I have misgivings about it in other respects”.

Indeed, Dugard is correct in his claim that the Israeli government forces (the IDF) have received a great deal of criticism from both the international community (the UN) and from former Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  Overall, Dugard's post appears to be the most objective. However, all the posts demonstrate that it is not clear whether the actions in Israel can be compared with that of South African Apartheid.  Clearly it is a matter of one’s perspective. 

OOPS, THEY DID IT AGAIN! THE FAILURE OF THE AMMAN TALKS

            A common theme found in the discourse surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict is the inability of peace talks to make any substantial progress in settling the territorial dispute between the Arabs and the Jews in Israel.  The inability of the international community and the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to come to an agreement on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict is once again demonstrated in the failure of the Amman talks that took place on January 25, 2012. The recent “peace talks” between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders were hosted in Amman, Jordan.   The talks were supervised by the international “Quartet”—which included the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), Russia, and the United States.  This failure appears to have been the impetus for the second request to the United Nations by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to recognize Palestinian statehood. On the website Bitter Lemons.org there are four editorials posted by academics and journalists who work with the online publication.  A common theme among the viewpoints is that the wheels of the peace talks continue to spin round and round as if stuck in mud with no hope of moving forward.

            Why is this the case? Is it political? Is it a failure of leadership? Is it the fault of the Palestinians? The Israelis?  The answer to this question depends on the point of view presented.  For example, according to Ghassan Khatib who represents the “Palestinian view”, the failure of the talks are a result of the failure of the Israeli government to stop the expansion of settlements into disputed territory as well as their failure to support a two state solution based on the borders of 1967.   Additionally, the talks “stalled” because of the failure of the international community to enforce international law to settle this dispute noting “we must rely on a third party” to resolve the conflict. Khatib argues that without international efforts by the US and the European Union, the two sides will never be “encouraged” (or pressured) to make an agreement.   According to Khatib, the Israelis are simply stalling in addressing their continued settlement expansion—this demonstrates that they have failed to take the talks (or past talks) seriously.  Khatib assumes that international pressure will resolve the decades-long conflict and that the stubbornness of the Israelis to compromise is the leading factors in the failure of the Amman talks.

            Maher Abukhater also representing the “Palestinian view” argues that the failure of border and security issues between the two nations is due to the international community putting pressure on President Abbas to negotiate while taking the side of the Israelis--this accusation is not backed by any real evidence only an unnamed Palestinian “official”.  Thus in his piece, the fault is not due to a lack of international action, but one that is biased towards the Israeli position. According to Abukhater, even Arab countries such as Jordan are pressuring the Palestinians to negotiate and the entire process appears to be tainted by a conspiracy between several Arab and western countries in their efforts to force Abbas to meet Israel’s demands.  For Abukhater, Abbas has few options open to him at this juncture, except to keep “talking” since this is the platform he ran on in 2005.  Abukhater also hints that because international aid is tied to his government he must continue to appease the western and Arab countries.

            On the Israeli side, Yossi Alpher sees the Amman talks as another act in the political “show” that the hosting and participating countries are starring in—all of whom are not really interested in a two state solution.  They are attending talks for their own political reasons.  Alpher presumes to know what the motives of the various participants are for participating in the talks.  For example, King Abdullah II can gain political points for hosting the meetings and at the same time demonstrate to the Palestinians in Jordan that Jordan can play a positive role in conflict resolution. But the fact that he didn’t bother to attend the talks (he simply sent an information officer) further demonstrates that this was simply a symbolic move on the part of the government.   The PLO leadership is also playing politics—Abbas understands that there can be no success if the goal is a “two state solution ending all claims” and that Abbas is simply pacifying the Quartet and King Abdullah in his efforts to fend of Hamas. 

            Alpher points out that Prime Minister Netanyahu understands that in an election year and therefore he must show good faith and participate in the talks to appease the centrist voters by appearing “reasonable”( even though the plans presented at the talks are not even close to the 1967 lines).  According to Alpher, the plans presented by Netanyahu do not support any of the positions at the Amman talks.  Additionally, the international Quartet is simply pursuing  “a path of folly”.   The failure to learn from past talks (e.g. Oslo Accords) demonstrate that the definition of insanity still holds true—keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect a different result! 

            Finally, Efraim Inbar offers an Israeli viewpoint, he also argues that the failure of the talks is of little surprise.  He primarily blames the Palestinians for the failure of the Amman talks due to their unilateral approach to peace negotiations and their unwillingness to accept the generous offers of 2000 and 2008 by the Israeli government.  According to Inbar  Prime Minister Netanyahu offered what was reasonable---Netanyahu could not improve upon the past.  While Inbar acknowledges that there were not many details about the talks, it appears that the Palestinians demand for Jerusalem was a major factor.  Additionally, he claims that the repeated refusal of the Palestinians to accept and acknowledge the Jewish state presents a major problem for the resolution of the conflict—it demonstrates that the Palestinians are not serious about peace.  They have also failed to demonstrate that they can successfully build a state.  He provides little factual evidence to support such claims.

            Efraim is quick to point out that conflict resolution must be replaced with conflict management and any attempts to conflict resolution are simply a facade.  The current political instability in the Arab countries has also hardened the position of the hardliners, especially because the pillar of Israel support (Egypt) is in serious jeopardy with the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt.

All the positions presented presume to know the political motives and preferences of the actors. They are also quick to place blame on the various actors associated with the peace talks. As one would expect in presenting viewpoints, some of factual information is tainted by ideological preferences.  The assumptions of the viewpoints presented are that the Amman talks were a failure. It is unclear to this blogger as to whether these talks have "failed"--at least the channels of communication are still in place.