The Fog of (Possible) War

There’s Something About Iran…Ramifications of the Israel-US-Iran Confrontation

         How does the Israeli-US-Iranian Crises impact the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?  Does this explain why is the international community ignoring the Palestinian issue?  How does the political upheaval in Syria or Arab Spring in general fit into this discussion?  Will resolving the Iranian crises first lead to a higher likelihood that the Israeli-Palestinean peace process will succeed?  Such questions are addressed by both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the bitter lemons.org website that addresses the Iranian crisis and its implication for resolving the Palestinian issue. 

         According to the Israeli view put forth by Yossi Alpher in his editorial "Its Not Iran" what happens between Israel and Iran (whether its resolved diplomatically or militarily) is irrelevant to the peace process between Israel and Palestinians since its not actively being sought by either side.  At the same time he notes that resolution of the conflict (eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat) would mean that the international community could once again focus on the peace process. This is what the Palestinian leadership should be striving for if they want the possibility of a two state solution.  He posits that a resolution between Israel and Palestinians could essentially soften the “instinctive” “anti-Israeli” rhetoric that a war with Iran would ignite.

Alpher also surmises that if the Alawite regime in Syria is eliminated then that too, would allow for the focus to go back to the peace process.  Since eliminating a regime that had sponsored such [anti-Israeli] terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah that would allow the peace process to “return to the agenda”.  Thus according to Alpher one of the main reasons why the Israeli-Palestinian issue has been ignored has to do with Arab Spring and the revolutionary wave that has spread throughout the Middle East. This has placed the conflict on a lower priority by the international community and Israel under Prime Minister Netanyahu. Such world events in addition to the fact that it is a US election year have meant that there will be no progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process.   Alpher suggests that the Fatah leadership under President Mahmoud Abbas needs to abandon the old rhetoric of previous leaders and find a new “narrative” that eliminates the pre-1967 issues of the right of return and holy places. He argues that since the peace talks are clearly on hiatus, the Israeli and Palestinians leadership should take the time to seek an alternative to Oslo. 

     Alpher claims that such international events or threats have nothing to do with the Israeli Palestinian peace process, but in fact according to his editorial they do.  Alpher’s assertions are speculative--one doesn’t know whether resolving the Iranian issue would make Netanyahu more amiable to peace with the Palestinians or influence the international community to refocus its attention on Israeli-Palestinian issue.  Perhaps if the conflict is resolved by force and not diplomatically, that would give Netanyahu assurance that holding a hard line with the Palestinians is the way to go. Or perhaps there are other factors that influence Netanyahu’s position towards the Palestinian leadership under President Abbas (mainly its relationship with Hamas?)  Perhaps another international crises will emerge in the near future--no one really knows. His assertion that the issue has been placed on the “back burner” (by the international community and Netanyahu) is apparent by the increased focus of the traditional actors involved in the peace talks (the US, Israel, Europe-- except for the Palestinians) on the Iranian crises.   Alpher asserts that those in the international community not involved in the crisis of Iran, Arab revolutions or involved in US elections should be focusing their attention on the peace process. This leaves open an important question:  Doesn’t a peace process also have to have both of the actors that are seeking peace make it a top priority for them as well?

            “Crisis creates opportunity” or so the Chinese proverb expressed by Gershon Baskin in his editorial entitled "From Crises to Crises". So how does the Iranian crisis create an opportunity for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict? Contrary to Alpher’s claim that there are benefits to resolving the Iranian issue before resolving the Palestinian issue, this Israeli perspective Gershon Baskin suggests that what would offset the pan-Arab reaction to an [inevitable] war with Iran would be an earnest attempt by the US and Europe to encourage Israel and Palestinian leadership to get the peace talks back on track.   So even if Israel and Iran are inevitably going to war (crises) there emerges the opportunity out of this crises to solidify the peace negotiations and doing so would quell anti-Israeli groups that would be in support of Iran.  He also notes that there may be little to gain by attacking Iran since it would ultimately destroy the opposition forces that are currently seeking to remove the ayatollahs whose legitimacy is in decline. 

            For Gershon, not only is there high tension and anxiety among the Israelis as a result of the Iranian conflict, any security issues that arise in the West Bank or Gaza in this atmosphere may result in an increase or “tightening” of security forces and regular army incursions Palestinian cities.   To complicate matters further, each side assume to know what the other is thinking--neither Netanyahu nor Abbas really want to reach an agreement.  This is supported by Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe “Boogie” Yaalon’s claim that we can only speak about conflict management.   Baskin notes that based on his “private discussions” with President Abbas that the President is quite open to negotiate with Netanyahu.  What is unclear is why President Abbas has not publicly made this claim but has only confided in Baskin about his position.  Some of what Baskin discusses in his editorial is speculative—we don’t know that attacking Iran would increase the support of the existing regime, nor do we know that Israel will necessarily tighten its security measures in Palestinian cities for fear of upheavals by pro-Iranian Palestinian groups.

Ghassan Khatab in his editorial, "Palestinians are caught in the Middle" provides a different (Palestinian) perspective on the Israeli-Iranian conflict.  Like the other editorials found in the posts he acknowledges that this conflict has regional and international implications, and he too believes that Iran is at the top of both the US and Israel’s agenda suggesting that the Palestine issue has fallen to the wayside. According to Khatab, the Palestinians are “caught in the middle” of a power play between China, Russia, Iran the US and Israel.  Adding to this complex power play is the political upheaval in Syria. He notes that Syria’s domestic conflict is now having regional and international implications because of the tension surrounding Iranian issue.  The problem is that Syria is supported by Iran (who is supported by both China and Russia) and if Syria falls, it would diminish Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria and its influence over Lebanon thus weakening its Iranian proxy (Hezbollah).  Iran cannot afford to lose this strategic axis.  For Khatab the implications go beyond “Arab Spring” and the issues of democracy and economic development—its now about preserving each actor’s strategic interests.

Khatab’s main concern is that there is increasing tension and speculation about what war with Iran would mean for the region, for Israel, for the Palestinians, for US allies and US strategic interests (oil) .The tension of the west is demonstrated by the increasing pressure on Israel to avoid war and instead seek other tactics such as embargos.  Moreover, this tension is spilling over into the internal divisions within Palestinian politics (unlike Gershon, who argues he tension will lead to increasing security forces in Palestinian cities) thus radicalizing those within Hamas that did not support the Doha Accords.

 

Khatab posits that the main factor limiting the options of the Palestinians is the tension between the west and Iran and all of the other complex power struggles within and outside of the region. Clearly, the factionalization among the Palestinians leadership is not just the result of regional and international tension--internal politics have played a role as well.  His suggestion that Palestinian interests have been left behind as a result of the Israeli-US-Iranian conflict and Arab Spring is supported in the media suggesting that the Palestinian issue has been sidelined as a result of the crisis.    The New York Times further support’s Khatab’s argument that Iran’s interest in Syria is a factor in the Israeli-US-Iranian conflict.  But it is unclear how internal divisions within the Doha accords is causing a problem for the Israeli-Palestinian issue given that Israel is not in favor of the a coalition between the parties of Fatah and Hamas.  If anything, it appears that a unified Palestinian front as a result of the  Doha Accords is in fact increasing tension with Israel.

Mkhaimar Abusada’s  post "The Impact of US-Israeli Confrontation with Iran" presents a similar argument to that of Khatab.  He argues from a Palestinian perspective that for decades, the larger regional and global conflicts continue to impact the status of Palestinians resolving their status of being a “nation without a state” (or so it is claimed).    Abusada like Baskin speculates that there will be no resolution to the Israeli-US-Iranian crisis, rather it is only a matter of time until the US and Israeli forces attack Iran, speculating that the Obama Administration wants to ensure another term and so they are pressuring Netanyahu not to act unilaterally until the elections are over.

 

 He argues that both the US and Europe are concerned that an attack on Iran will have heavy economic, political and military implications.  He asserts that attacking Iran unilaterally is not supported by the Israeli people (they are obsessed with the US as an ally) but does not cite any actual polls. Abusada further speculates that given the hawkish nature of the Likud party and Netanyahu’s desire for another term in office, an attack on Iran would have a positive impact on the party’s ability to maintain political power.   He also claims that Netanyahu is pressuring the Obama administration not to support NATO forces in Syria, since the collapse of the regime would create serious problems for a quiet Israeli-Syrian relationship.

The editorial posts found on bitterlemons.org are surprisingly similar in their argument that the major actors in the Israeli-US-Iranian conflict want Syria’s regime under Alawite to stay in power—but writers such as Abudada and Khatab suggests that Syrian’s political stability benefits different actors. All the authors recognize the impact that regional conflicts and watershed events such as the “Arab Spring” have further destabilized the region, strengthened Iran and increased tensions between Israel and Iran. Additionally they suggest that the conflict has either further divided the leadership of the Palestinians and or has ultimately have placed the peace talks "on the back burner" once again.    Is this crises going to further create opportunity or will it deepen the Arab-Israeli crisis?  Will an attack on Iran hurt the peace process? Would resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crises offset the possible backlash by anti-Israeli groups?  All of the authors have different yet similar answers.  As the above cartoon depicting the perspectives of the US-Israeli-Iranian (and other) actors suggests,  how to respond to the crises (and its implications for peace) is unclear.  Just as the discourse and rhetoric surrounding the Israeli-Iranian conflict is confusing and muddled so too are its implications for the continuation of peace negotiations between Israel and Palestinians.  Each perspective has a different take on Iranian crises and its implication for Israeli-Palestinian peace (which is dependent upon whether the US-Israel and Iran go to war) and are of course guided by each author’s ideological preferences.